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Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANT-AFFIDA-
VIT-RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-"FOUR CORNERS" DETERMI-
NATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE- EXCLUSIONARY RULE-REJECTION OF
"GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-MAGISTERIAL
NEUTRALITY.
Commonwealth v Edmunds, 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991).
On August 4, 1985, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Michael
D. Deise received a phone call from two anonymous males report-
ing that they had observed marijuana growing in, and in the imme-
diate vicinity of, a white corrugated metal building owned by one
Louis R. Edmunds (hereinafter "appellant").' In an effort to cor-
roborate this information, Deise conducted an aerial surveillance of
the property on August 5, observing the metal building in ques-
tion, but no marijuana.2 Deise also observed the name "Edmunds
228" printed on the mailbox apparently serving the property.'
Later, Officer Deise appeared before a local magistrate and ob-
tained a warrant covering the metal building in question as well as
the nearby Edmunds house.4 The warrant was thereafter served by
Deise and other members of the State Police.5 When confronted
with the warrant, appellant explained that the building in question
1. Commonwealth v Edmunds, 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887, 888-89 (1991). The prop-
erty in question was located in Donegal Township, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.
Edmunds, 586 A2d at 889.
2. Id at 889. The record makes no indication that any marijuana was observed on
the property during the aerial surveillance. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Why the residence was included in the search warrant when it was located on
a separate though contiguous parcel of land one-quarter mile away, and not included in the
warrant application, is unclear. A review of the trial court documents provides no further
illumination. Westmoreland County Criminal Docket No 1402 C 1985.
5. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 889.
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was leased to one Thomas Beacon.' Appellant entered his house to
retrieve a copy of said lease, accompanied by Deise.7 Therein the
trooper noted several large transparent bags of marijuana on a
stairway landing.8 After locating the lease, appellant and Deise ex-
ited the house and proceeded to the building about one-quarter
mile away wherein they located seventeen marijuana plants along
with a complete cultivation system.9 The marijuana was seized and
appellant was charged with criminal conspiracy, 10 possession with
intent to deliver,11 possession with intent to manufacture,12 and
manufacture of a controlled substance. 13
Appellant moved to suppress the marijuana seized as well as his
statements made to the police. 4 At the suppression hearing, Deise
testified concerning the information set forth in the affidavit.' 5 De-
fense counsel countered with the argument that the affidavit failed
to state the time frame within which the anonymous informants
6. Id. Trial court documents alternatively list lessee's name as "Tom Bacon" or
"Thomas Boron". Apparently, no charges were filed against this subject. Westmoreland
County Criminal Docket No 1402 C 1985.
7. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 889. Deise apparently followed appellant for the officer's
own protection and not pursuant to the warrant's reference to the house. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 903(a)(1) (Purdon 1991). The section reads in pertinent
part:
(a) Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or
persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commis-
sion he: (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them
will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime....
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 903(a)(1).
11. The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act No 64, 1972 Pa
Laws 233, codified at 35 Pa Stat § 780-113(a)(30) (Purdon Supp 1991). The act reads in
pertinent part:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby
prohibited: (30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery or posses-
sion with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance by a person not
registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropri-
ate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possession with intent to deliver,
a counterfeit controlled substance.
35 Pa Stat § 780-113(a)(30).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 889. Appellant's statements included admissions that he
maintained the cultivation equipment and that the marijuana in his residence was being
held for lessee Beacon. Westmoreland County Criminal Docket No 1402 C 1985.
15. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 889. The hearing was conducted on January 27, 1986 before
Common Pleas Judge Charles H. Loughran. Id.
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had observed the marijuana. 16 This contention was based on Penn-
sylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 200311 (hereinafter "Rule
2003") as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,"8 ren-
dering the evidence thus seized inadmissible because it was tainted
by the illegal search, making it "fruit of the poisonous tree.""' Rec-
ognizing this error, the trial court ruled that the affidavit was defi-
cient on its face and thus could not establish probable cause.20
Nevertheless, the court granted the prosecution's request to con-
vene a supplemental suppression hearing, the purpose of which
was to accept oral supplementation of the affidavit's facts, in order
to establish a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.2'
At the April 21, 1986 supplemental hearing, Deise testified that
while dictating the affidavit he stated that the informants had ob-
served the marijuana on August 4, but that the magistrate failed to
type this information onto the affidavit form.22 The magistrate's
testimony tended to confirm that of Trooper Deise, however she
16. Id.
17. Id. Rule 2003 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 2003. Requirements for Issuance.
(a) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more
affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority. The issuing authority, in determining
whether probable cause has been established, may not consider any evidence outside
the affidavits.
(b) At any hearing on a motion for the return or suppression of evidence, or for sup-
pression of the fruits of evidence, obtained pursuant to a search warrant, no evidence
shall be admissible to establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for
in paragraph (a).
PaRCrP 2003, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
18. The requirement that a search warrant affidavit based on an informant's observa-
tions recite the time frame of such observations was established in Commonwealth v Con-
ner, 452 Pa 333, 305 A2d 341 (1973). As in Edmunds, the court therein was confronted with
an affidavit which failed to state the time-frame of the informant's observations. The court
stated:
The search warrant is defective ...because the [magistrate] was not supplied a
time-frame upon which to ascertain ... when the informants themselves obtained
the information they allegedly had, and if probable cause presently existed to believe,
that at the time the warrant was issued [the subject was engaging in criminal
conduct.]
Conner, 305 A2d at 345-46 (emphasis in original).
19. Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,
§ 11.4 at 370 (West, 2d ed 1987). The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine originated when
Justice Frankfurter coined the phrase in his opinion in Nardone v United States, 308 US
338 (1920), in which the Court held that evidence derived from a violation of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in any
subsequent criminal proceeding. Id.
20. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890.
21. Id. See note 25 for an explanation of the "good faith" exception.
22. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890.
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was less clear as to whether he expressed or implied the date of the
informants' observations.23
At the close of the hearing the Judge ruled that, while the war-
rant was fatally defective under Rule 2003, the evidence seized
pursuant thereto was nevertheless admissible.24 Based on the testi-
mony at the supplemental hearing, the trial court concluded that
the officer had acted in "good faith" in executing the warrant and
that, under the test enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in United State v Leon,2 5 this was sufficient to permit ad-
mission of the seized items.
2 6
The appellant was found guilty as charged following a non-jury
trial before Common Pleas Judge Ackerman on August 18, 1987,
based upon the admitted evidence. Appeal was taken to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's ap-
plication of Leon to admit the evidence under the invalid war-
rant.28 The Superior Court further held that Article I, section 829
of the constitution of Pennsylvania afforded no greater protection
to citizens than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution,3 0 and that there was "no compelling reason to deviate
23. Id. When asked whether Trooper Deise had indicated that the events in question
had occurred the preceding day, District Justice Tlumac testified:
And I felt with knowing Officer Deise over a period of fifteen, twenty years and had
countless search warrants, and they were always fresh, that apparently he wouldn't
(sic) bring information that just occurred, that was so fresh. The question wouldn't
have even arose (sic) in my mind. And at that time I was under the impression this
all occurred the day before.
Id.
24. Id.
25. 468 US 897 (1984). In Leon the Court established a "good faith" exception to the
application of the exclusionary rule, which permitted the admission of evidence seized pur-
suant to an invalid warrant where the officer acted in good faith reliance on a warrant issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate. The Court in Leon stated that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, not punish judges and magistrates, and
therefore it would serve no purpose to apply the rule where no such misconduct was in-
volved. Leon, 468 US at 917-18.
26. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890.
27. Id at 887-88.
28. Commonwealth v Edmunds, 373 Pa Super 384, 541 A2d 368 (1988).
29. Pennsylvania's constitutional provision relating to search and seizure reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
persons or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor with-
out probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
30. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
Vol. 30:115
Recent Decisions
from the decision of the [C]ourt in Leon."'"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider
whether the constitution of Pennsylvania incorporated a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, which would permit the
introduction of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant.
32
Reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court began its
analysis with an examination of the Leon decision's effect on the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, noting that
the holding mandates an exception to the operation of the exclu-
sionary rule in instances where the police relied in good faith upon
a search warrant issued. by a neutral and detached magistrate.33
Next the court turned to Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
constitution to see if it likewise allowed for such an exception.
3 4
Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, noted the growing ac-
knowledgement by states that the federal Constitution presents a
floor below which a state's recognition of rights may not fall, but
above which it may establish a higher level of state-created rights
than those federally protected.3 5
The framework of reasoning employed in the majority opinion
consisted of a four-part method of analyzing the relationship be-
tween the Pennsylvania and federal constitutional provisions gov-
erning search and seizure. In devising such a method, Justice
Cappy expressly provided guidance for future parties in addressing
state constitutional issues having a federal constitutional
counterpart.3 6
First the court examined the text of the state and federal provi-
sions and observed that they were similar, though not identically
worded.3 7 Next the court conducted an examination of the history
of Pennsylvania's Article I, section 8, which revealed that it pre-
dated the Fourth Amendment by more than a decade. 8 The exam-
ination further revealed that, throughout most of its history, the
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US Const, Amend IV.
31. Edmunds, 541 A2d at 372.
32. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 891.
33. Id at 892-93.
34. Id at 894-95.
35. Id at 894.
36. Id at 895.
37. Id. See notes 29 and 30.
38. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 896. The Pennsylvania constitution was ratified on Sep-
tember 28, 1776; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in
1791. Id.
1991
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Pennsylvania courts have interpreted section 8 as providing the
same level of protection as that afforded by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 9 However, beginning in the early 1970's the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court began to forge their own line of reasoning inter-
preting Article I, section 8 as providing greater protection than
that afforded by its federal counterpart.40 Accordingly the court
found historical justification for diverging from the Leon deci-
sion.41 The primary factors relied on by the court were the con-
cepts of privacy inherent in the state constitution42 and the funda-
mental requirement that warrants should only issue based on
probable cause.43
Third, the court looked to the decisions of other states which
have examined the question in light of their own constitutions, and
found convincing the reasoning enunciated in those opinions.44
Finally, questions of policy were addressed. In noting that the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure evidenced a strong pol-
icy toward excluding from the probable cause determination or its
review any information not found within the four corners of the
affidavit,45 the court chose to stand on firmly-established prece-
dent, rather than break state jurisprudential tradition.46 While
39. Id at 898.
40. Id. For example, in Commonwealth v DeJohn, 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979),
the court explicitly linked the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures to
the implicit right of privacy in the Commonwealth; and more recently in Commonwealth v
Melilli, 521 Pa 405, 555 A2d 1254 (1989), the court emphasized, "Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution... may be employed to guard individual privacy rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures more zealously than the federal government does under
the Constitution of the United States by serving as an independent source of supplemental
rights." Melilli, 555 A2d at 1258.
41. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 899.
42. Id. Pennsylvania's right of privacy is rooted in Article I, section 8 (cited in note
29). Edmunds, 586 A2d at 899. See also note 40.
43. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 899.
44. Id at 900-01. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the exception
because it would undermine the probable cause requirement embedded in that state's con-
stitutional jurisprudence; the Supreme Court of Connecticut did likewise because the excep-
tion would conflict with Conn Const, Art I, § 7, designed to protect the integrity of the
warrant issuance process as a whole; and the exception was rejected by the North Carolina
Supreme Court because it would render ineffective the state constitution's privacy protec-
tions as well as impugn the integrity of the judicial branch of government. Id.
45. Id at 901-02. See also note 18.
46. A strong tradition exists in state appellate court decisions, strictly interpreting
the "four corners" requirement of PaRCrP 2003. See, for example, Commonwealth v Cross,
508 Pa 322, 496 A2d 1144 (1985) ("Nothing outside the written search warrant affidavit may
be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.") Cross, 496 A2d at 1150,
quoting Commonwealth v Luddy, 281 Pa Super 541, 422 A2d 601, 608 (1980); and Common-
wealth v O'Shea, 328 Pa Super 104, 476 A2d 911 (1984). Indeed, PaRCrP 2003(b) was
120
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such a strict determination is not mandated by the state constitu-
tion, its retention in the rules combined with judicial approval for
nearly two decades demonstrates the importance which inheres in
the policy surrounding the determination of probable cause in the
warrant issuance process.,"
Throughout its opinion, the majority made reference to the exis-
tence of "adequate and independent" state grounds as forming the
foundation for the decision (so as to preclude federal review under
the Michigan v Long'" test). The majority also refered to the ne-
cessity of exercising the state's independence and freedom to inter-
pret its analogous constitutional provisions as providing more
stringent protection than those in the Bill of Rights.4' The court
concluded its reasoning by examining issues relating to the ques-
tionable premises of Leon,50 the lack of a need for a "good faith"
exception in light of federal and state court approval of the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test for assessing probable cause,51 and
the necessity of magisterial independence in probable cause
determination.2
promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1973 in the aftermath of their decision
in Commonwealth v Milliken, 450 Pa 310, 300 A2d 78 (1973), which decided that informa-
tion beyond the affidavit could be considered under the version of the rule then in existence.
PaRCrP, Official Comment to Rule 2003(b), 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
47. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 903.
48. 463 US 1032 (1983). In Long the Court stated:
[W]hen... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept
as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it
did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If the state court decision
indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate,
adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the
decision.
Long, 463 US at 1040-41.
49. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 894-95, 906.
50. Id at 904. The court particularly called into question the alleged serious costs
incurred by society when defendants go free as a result of the exclusion of key evidence.
"Indeed, the Leon decision itself indicates relatively low statistics with respect to the impact
of the exclusionary rule in thwarting legitimate prosecution." Id. See also Leon, 468 US at
907 n.6.
51. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 904. Under the "totality of the circumstances" test enunci-
ated in Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 (1983), the reviewing court is allowed to take into
account all facts and circumstances in the affidavit, including the "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge" of the informant, and then make a common sense determination as to whether
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing] that probable cause existed."
Gates, 462 US at 238-39. This test was adopted by Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v Gray,
509 Pa 476, 503 A2d 921 (1986).
52. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 904.
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Justice Papadakos issued a concurring opinion which agreed
only with the majority's reasoning on the warrant's invalidity.5 3
Central to his opinion was reliance on Pennsylvania Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 2003(a), which outlines the requirements for a valid
search warrant affidavit. 4 While Justice Papadakos agreed with
the majority's reversal on the basis that the affidavit in question
neglected to mention the crucial date of the informants' observa-
tions,55 he was quick to point out that were it not for the "clear,
unequivocal command" of the Rule he would have joined in the
dissent.5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice McDermott stressed the purpose
of the exclusionary rule as prevention of police misconduct, not be-
cause the evidence sought to be excluded is untrustworthy or unre-
liable.57 In citing a group of cases employing reasoning contrary to
that of the majority, Justice McDermott highlighted instances in
which the court has previously applied his favored rationale to ex-
clusionary rule situations in order to mitigate that rule's effects.
5 8
The dissent concluded by according greater deference to the allow-
ance made by the United States Supreme Court in creating a
"good faith" exception, stating that such an allowance should not
be foreclosed under state law absent "clear evidence of positive
need.,
5 9
At common law, the admissibility of evidence did not depend
upon the legality of means by which it was obtained.6 0 The re-
quirement that warrants be based upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, is found in the text of the Fourth Amend-
53. Id at 906 (Papadakos dissenting).
54. Id. See note 17 for text of the rule.
55. See note 18.
56. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 906.
57. Id at 907-08 (McDermott dissenting).
58. Id at 907-09. For example, Justice McDermott cites Commonwealth ex rel Wilson
v Rundle, 412 Pa 109, 194 A2d 143 (1963), in which the court stated: "the purpose [of the
exclusionary rule is] ... to discourage police officials from conduct in violation of the Con-
stitution." Rundle, 194 A2d at 148; Commonwealth v Corley, 507 Pa 540, 491 A2d 829
(1985), in which the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in situations where evi-
dence was seized by a private citizen; and Commonwealth v Brown, 470 Pa 274, 368 A2d 626
(1976), in which the court held that where evidence illegally seized by police would never-
theless "have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no pur-
pose is served in applying the exclusionary rule." Brown, 368 A2d at 631.
59. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 909. Justice McDermott stated: "To do otherwise is to pro-
vide a sanctuary for the lawless elements seeking profit, particularly in the growing human
misery of addiction." Id.
60. Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 467 (1927).
Vol. 30:115
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ment to the United States Constitution61 as well as in the provi-
sions of state constitutions. The Fourth Amendment's text, how-
ever, does not specify a means by which its terms are to be
enforced.
The lack of specific enforcement language has resulted in the
creation of a judicial remedy to deter and penalize violations of the
Fourth Amendment. Evidence seized in violation of its require-
ments was first held inadmissible in federal prosecutions when the
United States Supreme Court established what has come to be
known as the "exclusionary rule ' 2 in Weeks v United States. 3
This rule, however, originally applied only to limit the actions of
federal officers.6 4
With the growth of selective incorporation 65 as a vehicle for ap-
plying the provisions of the federal Constitution to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,""
the Fourth Amendment's provisions were interpreted as applicable
to actions of state officers in Wolf v Colorado.7 Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority, held that the Fourth Amendment's
provisions should be applied to the states via incorporation in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a right basic
61. See note 30 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
62. While other constitutional provisions have exclusionary rules annexed to them,
specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the term as used in this case note shall refer
exclusively to the practice of excluding from criminal proceedings evidence seized in viola-
tion of a person's Fourth Amendment rights.
63. 232 US 383 (1914).
64. Weeks, 232 US at 398.
65. Selective incorporation refers to the doctrine by which the Supreme Court "ab-
sorbs one-by-one the individual guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and holds them applicable to the States with all the
subtleties and refinements born of history and embodied in the case experience developed in
the context of federal adjudication." William v Florida, 399 US 78, 130-31 (1970) (Harlan
dissenting).
66. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent
part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
US Const, Amend XIV.
67. 338 US 25, 33 (1949). In Wolf, the defendant was convicted in a Colorado state
court based on evidence seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The conviction
was sustained by the Colorado appellate courts, and appeal was taken to the United States
Supreme Court. Wolf, 338 US at 26.
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to our society and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 68
Nevertheless, the Court found no concomitant requirement that
the exclusionary rule be imposed upon the states as a remedy. 9
It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court reconsidered the
manner of redressing violations of the Fourth Amendment by state
officers. In Mapp v Ohio,70 the defendant was accused of posses-
sion of obscene pictures and literature following a warrantless
search of her residence.7 1 Despite the prosecution's unexplained
failure to produce a search warrant at trial, the defendant's convic-
tion was affirmed by the Ohio appellate courts.72 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be extended as a remedy available to de-
fendants in state courts for violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights.73
The Court examined the factual bases for Wolf and concluded
that the present fact situation was sufficiently different to warrant
a reversal.74 One of the main points in the Court's reasoning was
the recognition that at the time of Wolf, two-thirds of the states
had rejected application of the exclusionary rule in their courts,
while by 1961 over one-half of the states supported the rule.7 5 Fur-
ther, the Court observed that other enforcement remedies tried by
the states in the intervening twelve years had failed.7 6 Accordingly,
the Court held "that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inad-
missible in a state court.
'77
68. Id at 27.
69. Id. In noting that most of the English-speaking world did not require exclusion as
the remedy for an illegal search and seizure, the Court observed that this did not leave the
victim without recourse. Id at 30. Illegal searches by state authorities could still be effec-
tively redressed by a private action at law against the searching officer, invocation of a stat-
utory remedy available in many states, and even citation of the officer for contempt of court.
Id at 30 n.1. Local pressure was thought to be more efficacious in curbing police abuses in
this area than would a mandatory exclusionary rule fashioned at the federal level. Id at 33.
70. 367 US 643 (1961).
71. Mapp, 367 US at 644-45.
72. Id at 645.
73. Id at 645-46.
74. Id at 653.
75. Id at 651. The Court also took note of the affirmative statements made by the
Court in Wolf in support of extension of the rule to the states. Id at 650.
76. Id at 651-52. Some unsuccessful attempts included statutes imposing criminal lia-
bility on searching officers and magistrates in cases of illegal searches, and civil actions
against such officers. Id at 652.
77. Id at 655. In this decision the Court put the right to privacy against unreasonable
government intrusion on the same footing as other constitutional rights. Because the right
Vol. 30:115
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The Mapp decision's foundation was legal common sense."s The
extension of the exclusionary rule as an essential part of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments was seen as a logical progres-
sion from prior cases. To permit the Constitution to serve as the
basis for allowing a state prosecutor to use the same evidence that
a federal prosecutor could not, for example, would be logically in-
consistent.79 Paramount among the motivations cited by the Court
for extending the exclusionary rule to the states were the rule's
deterrent effect against improper law enforcement conduct8" and
the imperative of preserving judicial integrity.8 '
Over the years the exclusionary rule has been the subject of
much academic criticism8 2 which has been reflected in the Court's
decisions. Since Mapp, the Supreme Court has been faced with a
number of challenges mainly because of the exclusionary rule's
perceived protection of the rights of the "guilty." ' s In rendering
decisions permitting illegally seized evidence to serve as the basis
for grand jury questions,84 to be used in federal civil tax proceed-
ings if illegally seized by state officers,8 5 and allowing illegally
seized evidence to be used to impeach the testimony of its victim,8 6
the Court focused on the rule's primary deterrent purpose.
After facing a number of challenges to its continuing efficacy, the
stage was ultimately set for consideration of the limits of the exclu-
sionary rule. The need for a remedy for searches conducted by law
enforcement officials in objectively reasonable reliance on a facially
to free speech, a fair and public trial, etc., are strictly enforced against state infringement,
the Court reasoned that so should the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 656.
78. Id at 657. "There is no war between the Constitution and common sense." Id.
79. Id. Allowing the system to continue under the Wolf criteria would be to permit
the perpetuation of a system which encourages disregard for the Fourth Amendment by
allowing evidence to be used in a state prosecution, regardless of the means used in seizing
it. Id at 658.
80. Id.
81. Id at 659.
82. See, for example, Kingsley A. Taft, Protecting the Public From Mapp v Ohio
Without Amending the Constitution, 50 ABA J 815 (1964); John G. Miles, Jr., Decline of
the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule Mapp v Ohio, 27 Cath U L Rev 9 (1977); and
Malcolm Richard Wickey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Judi-
cature 214 (1978).
83. The basis of this criticism is that in the case of innocent persons, there would
theoretically be no "evidence" to exclude. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v Ohio and
Beyond. The Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure Cases, 83 Colum L Rev 1365, 1396 (1983).
84. United States v Calandra, 414 US 338 (1974).
85. United States v Janis, 428 US 433 (1976).
86. United States v Havens, 446 US 620 (1980).
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valid search warrant which is later found to be lacking probable
cause was addressed in Leon v United States.
87
In Leon the defendant's property was searched by officers of the
Burbank Police Department pursuant to a warrant based on an
informant's observations of alleged drug trafficking activity at the
residences in question.8 Based on their surveillance observations
of numerous persons with drug-related criminal records entering
and leaving the residence with bags of varying size, the officers ob-
tained the warrant from a State Superior Court judge.s In execut-
ing the warrant large quantities of drugs were seized, as well as
other incriminating evidence.90 The defendants' motion to sup-
press the seized evidence was granted in part by the District Court
for the Central District of California, which refused the Govern-
ment's suggestion that a good faith exception to the operation of
the exclusionary rule be applied in this instance, as being inconsis-
tent with the law of the Circuit, but took note of the officer's good
faith as a matter of fact.9
Upon the Government's appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court9 2 on the ground that the
affidavit used to procure the search warrant failed to contain state-
ments sufficient to amount to probable cause.9 3 The Government
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari to consider the propriety of modifying the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule so as to allow the admission of evi-
dence seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant
that is subsequently held to be defective.94 Delivering the opinion
of the Court, Justice White relied on a balancing of the privacy
interests of the individual and the need to deter official misconduct
87. 468 US 897 (1984).
88. Leon, 468 US at 901-02.
89. Id.
90. Id at 902.
91. Id at 904 n.4.
92. Leon v United States, 701 F2d 187 (9th Cir 1983).
93. Leon, 468 US at 904. Specifically, the Court of Appeals relied on the district
court's finding that the affidavits failed both prongs of the test enunciated in Aguilar v
Texas, 378 US 108 (1964), and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 (1969), which required
in pertinent part that statements made by an informant and offered by police in support of
establishing probable cause be fresh and show sufficient facts to establish the informant's
credibility. The Aguilar-Spinelli test was subsequently abandoned in Gates, 462 US 213
(1983), in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" approach for determining probable
cause. See note 51. The Court of Appeals likewise refused to grant the Government's re-
quest that they recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 US at
905.
94. Leon, 468 US at 905.
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in conducting searches and seizures, against the importance of es-
tablishing procedures under which criminal defendants are tried
based upon entirely relevant, competent, and reliable evidence 5
In balancing these considerations, the Court applied a cost/benefit
analysis, assessing the effects of employing the rule in instances of
a Fourth Amendment violation. 6 Noting that the collateral effect
of the exclusionary rule is that some guilty will go free, 97 Justice
White looked beyond the automatic application of the rule, con-
ducting a deeper inquiry into the purposes served by it.98
As originally enunciated in Mapp, the application of the exclu-
sionary rule is designed to accomplish the dual purpose of deter-
ring police misconduct and preserving judicial integrity.9 The
Court reexamined these dual purposes in the context of searches
conducted by law enforcement officers acting in good faith, noting
that in such situations the act of excluding evidence and allowing
the guilty to go free "offends basic concepts of criminal justice."'
100
In such instances, since the police did not engage in improper con-
duct, there is nothing to deter.10 Further, automatic application of
the exclusionary rule could produce disrespect for the law, in oppo-
sition to one of the rule's stated goals.0 2
Based upon these factors, it was decided that a modification of
the exclusionary rule was in order. To achieve this end, the Court
held that the marginal or nonexistent benefits of the rule's applica-
tion in cases where officers acted in good faith reliance on a war-
rant were far outweighed by the substantial costs of exclusion. 03
Under this loosened federal standard, therefore, a search con-
ducted under a search warrant later found invalid for lack of prob-
able cause will generally not result in suppression of the evidence
seized pursuant thereto.104
In Pennsylvania, the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule was first recognized by a federal district court in United
States v Martinez-Zayas,10 5 where the court upheld a search war-
95. Id at 900-01.
96. Id at 906.
97. Id at 907.
98. Id.
99. Mapp, 367 US at 659.
100. Leon, 468 US at 908, citing Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 490 (1976).
101. Leon, 468 US at 909.
102. Id at 908.
103. Id at 922.
104. Id.
105. 658 F Supp 79 (ED Pa 1987), aff'd, 857 F2d 122 (3d Cir 1988).
1991
Duquesne Law Review
rant based upon statements of a confidential informant under the
totality of the circumstances test.106 In dicta, the court observed
that even if probable cause was lacking in the instant case, the evi-
dence would still be admissible under the Leon good faith excep-
tion.l07 While state courts are bound by the decisions of the federal
appellate courts in construing federal constitutional rights, the ex-
istence of Article I, section 810 in the Pennsylvania constitution
provides state courts with another means of protecting the right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
The decisions of the Pennsylvania appellate courts in construing
rights under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution
have taken a serpentine path over the past three decades, alter-
nately following United States Supreme Court precedent in inter-
preting state constitutional questions analogous to those decided
by the Court under the Fourth Amendment, and later developing a
distinguishable line of reasoning. Pennsylvania's courts initially
followed the common law rule that evidence illegally obtained was
nevertheless admissible as long as it was relevant, competent, and
not subject to a privilege, until the time of the Mapp decision. 09
The practice of excluding evidence seized in violation of a de-
fendant's constitutional rights was first implemented in Common-
wealth v Bosurgi,"l0 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized the Mapp doctrine."" The defendant moved to
suppress items of evidence based upon the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, due to their seizure during an illegal
search. 112 The trial court ruled in defendant's favor,"$ and the
Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
106. Martinez-Zayas, 658 F Supp at 83.
107. Id.
108. See note 29 for the text of Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
109. See Commonwealth v Chaitt, 380 Pa 532, 112 A2d 379 (1955). See also Common-
wealth v Dabbiero, 290 Pa 174, 138 A 679, 681 (1927); Commonwealth v Hunsinger, 290 Pa
185, 138 A 683 (1927); and Commonwealth v Agoston, 364 Pa 464, 72 A2d 575, 585, 586
(1950).
110. 411 Pa 56, 190 A2d 304 (1963). Under the facts of this case, appellant was
charged with burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen goods following a search by police who
spotted appellant in a taproom after receiving an informant's tip that a man was attempting
to sell watches there. Bosurgi, 190 A2d at 306. Aware of the burglary of a jewelry store the
previous day, police patted down appellant and thereby discovered stolen watches and jew-
elry in his trouser pocket, along with glass fragments apparently from the store's broken
window. Id.
111. Id at 309.




which reversed. 114 The Supreme Court granted allocatur to con-
sider the legality of the search and seizure of the evidence." 5 Not-
ing that this was the first search and seizure question to reach the
court since the decision in Mapp, " the court held it controlled
and required application of the Fourth Amendment's provisions to
the state via the Fourteenth Amendment., 1 While appellant based
his argument on both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution, the decision failed to ad-
dress the state constitutional aspects of the claim, possibly indicat-
ing by implication that they were coincidental with the federal
right.
In the years after Bosurgi, the Pennsylvania appellate courts de-
cided a number of cases which continued their accord with the fed-
eral exclusionary rule.118 Significant is the fact that virtually all of
these early post-Mapp decisions rely solely on the federal Consti-
tution, without invoking the provisions of Article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania constitution. 1 9 Throughout most of Pennsylvania's
history, this section was regarded by the courts as being merely
affirmative of the common law.
120
As Pennsylvania appellate courts proceeded in their interpreta-
tion of Article I, section 8, the decisions took a decidedly different
turn beginning in the early 1970's. Prior to that time, most deci-
sions interpreted section 8 as co-extensive in scope with the Fourth
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
114. Commonwealth v Bosurgi, 198 Pa Super 47, 182 A2d 295 (1962).
115. Bosurgi, 190 A2d at 307.
116. Id at 306.
117. Id at 309. The court observed, however, that Mapp apparently did not require
states to employ federal standards for determining reasonableness, and therefore the court
was free to make an independent determination of the reasonableness of the search of ap-
pellant. Id. In concluding that reasonableness must be determined on an ad hoc basis, based
on the ruling in Commonwealth v Hunsinger, 89 Pa Super 238, - A -, aft'd, 290 Pa 185,
138 A 683 (1927), the court examined the facts surrounding the search and found them to be
reasonable. Bosurgi, 190 A2d at 311.
118. See, for example, Commonwealth v Wright, 411 Pa 81, 190 A2d 79 (1963); Com-
monwealth v Wright, 415 Pa 55, 202 A2d 79 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel Ensor v Cum-
mings, 416 Pa 510, 207 A2d 230 (1965); and Commonwealth v Smyser, 205 Pa Super 599,
211 A2d 59 (1965).
119. Indeed, even Commonwealth v Platou, 455 Pa 258, 312 A2d 29 (1973), often cited
as the turning point in independent interpretation of Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
constitution, does not engage in independent analysis of section 8; rather, it states that the
Fourth Amendment analysis employed is equally applicable to section 8. Platou, 312 A2d at
31 n.2.
120. Commonwealth v Van Leer, 75 D & C 404, 406 (1950), quoting Commonwealth v
Rubin, 82 Pa Super 315, - A - (1923).
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The genesis of independent state constitutional interpretation in
the area of search and seizure occurred in Commonwealth v
Platou.12 1 In Platou, appellant was charged with possession of ma-
rijuana following its discovery during a search of his suitcase in a
friend's apartment. 2 2 Police entered the apartment armed with a
warrant permitting them to search for marijuana belonging to the
apartment's lessee. 23 Prior to entry the police neither knew of, nor
did the warrant specify, appellant's suitcases as subjects of the
search, and appellant identified them as his personal property
prior to the search.124 In defining appellant's right to be free from
government intrusion into his personal effects, the court stated,
"[s]o long as a person seeks to preserve his effects as private, even
if they are accessible to the public or to others, they are constitu-
tionally protected.'
'2 5
The impetus given the right of privacy in Platou gained further
momentum six years later, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided Commonwealth v DeJohn.26 In DeJohn, appellant was
charged with criminal homicide and theft by extortion, with mo-
tive evidence admitted at trial including copies of bank records ob-
tained by the prosecution under an admittedly invalid subpoena.
27
Appeal was taken directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which had to either accept the Commonwealth's contention that
such records enjoyed no protection (essentially being "public" in
nature, a position finding support in United States v Miller2 S), or
find an independent state constitutional ground barring such war-
rantless disclosure.
In the majority opinion rejecting the Miller rationale, the Su-
preme Court found persuasive the reasoning of the California Su-
preme Court in Burrows v Superior Court of San Bernardino
County.129 In an opinion which quoted heavily from Burrows, the
121. 455 Pa 258, 312 A2d 29 (1973).
122. Platou, 312 A2d at 31.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id at 34, quoting Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 351 (1967). In holding the
search illegal as violative of appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the
Supreme Court stated that their reasoning, while versed in reference to the Fourth Amend-
ment, was equally applicable to the state constitution's Article I, section 8. Platou, 312 A2d
at 31 n.2.
126. 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979).
127. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1287.
128. 425 US 435 (1976).
129. 118 Cal Rptr 166, 529 P2d 590 (1974). Burrows interpreted a comparable section
of the California constitution to extend a right of privacy to bank account records. Burrows,
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court saw the key difference in the federal/
state interpretation as being that state law does not view the "pub-
lic" exposure of such records in commercial channels (such as the
negotiation and cashing of checks, their microfilming and retention
by banks, etc.) as sufficient to divest the accountholder's privacy
interest therein.130 The court, viewing Miller as a "dangerous pre-
cedent,"'13 rejected the Commonwealth's arguments advancing the
public nature of bank records and held that bank customers have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in records pertaining to their af-
fairs kept at the bank. 32 Appellant's homicide conviction was re-
versed on the ground that it was tainted by the improper admis-
sion of the bank records.1
33
Prior to DeJohn, a violation of a defendant's Article I, section 8
right against unreasonable search and seizure had not served as an
independent basis for the exclusion of evidence. The decision
marks the turning point in interpretation of Article I, section 8
from one simply mirroring federal precedent, to a truly individual
line of reasoning supporting a broader version of the right than
that recognized under the Fourth Amendment.
3 4
The Supreme Court further bolstered the state right of privacy
in Commonwealth v Sell,' in which it declined to adopt the
"amorphous legitimate expectation of privacy" standard which had
been rendered ambiguous by United States Supreme Court deci-
sions.'" 6 Instead, the court invoked the language of Article I, sec-
529 P2d at 596.
130. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1289.
131. Id.
132. Id at 1291.
133. Id.
134. It is interesting to note that throughout Pennsylvania's decisions holding evi-
dence inadmissible because of violation of the state constitution, the courts have applied a
federal remedy to the violation -of a state right. In his DeJohn dissent, Justice Larsen ob-
served that the question of whether it is proper to apply the federal exclusionary rule as a
remedy for a violation of the Pennsylvania constitution has never been addressed by the
court. Id at 1293-94. Without answering this question, Justice Larsen strongly argues for the
modification of the exclusionary rule to allow for the weighing of the seriousness of the
constitutional violation to determine if it is gross, willful, or substantial, and applying the
rule only in those instances where such is found to be the case. Id at 1299.
135. 504 Pa 46, 470 A2d 457 (1983). Sell attempted to challenge the seizure of weapons
from an arcade in which he owned an interest, which weapons also formed the basis for a
charge of receiving stolen property. The Court of Common Pleas granted him automatic
standing (i.e., standing without asserting a possessory interest in the evidence, due to his
part ownership of the premises wherein the seizure occurred), but the Superior Court re-
versed, essentially placing appellant on the horns of a dilemma, to choose assertion of his
rights under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, but not both. Sell, 403 A2d at 459.
136. 470 A2d at 468. See, for example, Rakas v United States, 439 US 128 (1978), in
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tion 8 to grant automatic standing to challenge the seizure of items
to anyone regarded as having ownership or possession of the seized
property, since by virtue of the Commonwealth's allegations, such
person would necessarily have the requisite interests in the item.137
Despite this strong line of Supreme Court cases interpreting Ar-
ticle I, section 8 as a broader source of privacy protection, begin-
ning in 1987 the Pennsylvania Superior Court began rendering de-
cisions which seemed to ignore this theoretical background of
section 8 and instead applied Leon's reasoning in its
interpretation.'38
In Commonwealth v Melilli,5 9 the Superior Court was con-
fronted with a case where appellant was the subject of a warrant-
less installation of a dialed number recorder (hereinafter "DNR")
on his telephone line. 140 As a result of information gained from the
DNR, police obtained search warrants and authorized wiretaps
which produced evidence of illegal gambling and corrupt organiza-
tions. 1 4 1 In reversing the trial court's suppression of all evidence
obtained as a result of the DNR's use, the Superior Court noted
that while such methods are now considered a violation of the right
against unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, section 8
of the Pennsylvania constitution, the decision establishing that
right was not yet rendered when the officers utilized the device. 142
The Superior Court went on to analyze the admissibility of evi-
dence gathered by use of the DNR under a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. The court noted that, at the time of their
actions, the officers could not have known their conduct would be
proscribed and did all they could to comport with the law's re-
which the Court denied standing to challenge a seizure to one charged with a possessory
offense, unless he first was determined to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place. This in effect would require a defendant in such a situation to choose be-
tween invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, and his ability to
challenge an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
137. Sell, 470 A2d at 468.
138. See note 25 and accompanying text.
139. 361 Pa Super 429, 522 A2d 1107 (1987), vacated, 521 Pa 405, 555 A2d 1254
(1989).
140. Melilli, 522 A2d at 1108-09. A DNR is also known as a pen register. Id.
141. Id at 1109.
142. Id. The warrantless use by law enforcement officials of DNRs was held to violate
a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in Commonwealth v Beauford, 327 Pa Super
253, 475 A2d 783 (1984). However, at the time of the installation, police relied on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979), which held that




quirements then in existence. 143 Invoking the theory repeated in
Leon that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct, and noting that none was present here, the
court found it would serve no useful purpose to exclude the deriva-
tive evidence obtained through use of the DNR.144
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, intending that it have
narrow application. Under the Melilli test, evidence seized in viola-
tion of a defendant's federal or state constitutional rights would
nevertheless be admissible "if law enforcement officials have acted
(1) in good faith; (2) in reasonable reliance upon a procedure ex-
pressly sanctioned by existing judicial decisions; and (3) pursuant
to authorization obtained from a neutral magistrate.' '
45
The Superior Court further considered the good faith exception
adopted in Melilli in several cases thereafter. In Commonwealth v
Morris146 appellant was convicted of third degree murder following
the discovery of incriminating evidence by state police during their
execution of a search warrant.1 47 Appellant moved to suppress the
evidence based on the fact that the search warrant was procured in
violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 2003(b),148
insofar as the warrant was issued based upon oral statements in
support of probable cause which were not subsequently included in
the application's affidavit.1 49 In denying appellant's motion, the
trial court relied on Melilli to support a good faith exception to
operation of the exclusionary rule in the face of the violation of
Rule 2003(b), finding that the officers' actions complied with the
Melilli test.1 50 The Superior Court affirmed the trial court decision
on the same grounds.
51
The application of the good faith exception as a matter of Penn-
sylvania law was again considered in Commonwealth v Schaef-
fer. 51 Electronic surveillance of appellant was conducted through
the use of a "body wire" and associated recording apparatus to rec-
ord a sale of marijuana by appellant to an informant cooperating
143. Meilli, 522 A2d at 1112.
144. Id at 1111-12.
145. Id at 1112.
146. 368 Pa Super 237, 533 A2d 1042 (1987).
147. Morris, 533 A2d at 1043.
148. See note 17 for the text of Rule 2003.
149. Morris, 533 A2d at 1043.
150. Id at 1043-44.
151. Id.




In reviewing the propriety of the electronic surveillance the Su-
perior Court, sitting en banc, decided to overrule their previous de-
cision in Commonwealth v Harvey,' which had found such prac-
tices permissible where officers secured the permission of at least
one party to the communication. 55 Faced with the resulting ille-
gality of the means by which evidence had been gathered against
appellant, the court decided that exclusion was appropriate. 56
In refusing to apply the Melilli good faith exception, the court
noted the absence in the instant case of a probable cause determi-
nation prior to the invasion of appellant's privacy interest. 5 ' In
doing so the court distinguished the instant case from that of Me-
lilli, and reversed and remanded for a new trial with all fruits of
the illegal electronic surveillance suppressed. 58
After Schaeffer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed that
part of the Melilli decision dealing with the good faith excep-
tion.159 After agreeing with the Superior Court's reasoning regard-
ing the state constitutional right to privacy being violated by the
warrantless installation of the pen register,6 ° Justice Papadakos'
majority opinion examined the lower court's invocation of the Leon
decision as justification for applying a good faith exception.' 6' He
noted that while the officers had apparently reasonably relied on
existing precedent at the time they installed the pen register, in
doing so they nevertheless intruded into an area fundamentally
protected under Article I, section 8 without first obtaining a war-
rant from a neutral and detached magistrate. 62 In view of these
153. Schaeffer, 536 A2d at 355. As a result of the intercepted communications, police
obtained a search warrant, the execution of which resulted in the discovery of evidence suffi-
cient to charge appellant with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and
three counts of simple possession of a controlled substance. A motion to suppress the evi-
dence was denied by the trial court and, after conviction, the defendant appealed to the
Superior Court. Id at 356.
154. 348 Pa Super 544, 502 A2d 679 (1985).
155. Schaeffer, 536 A2d at 376.
156. Id.
157. Id. Further, the officers could not claim to have been acting in good faith reliance
on a valid judicial interpretation of Pennsylvania law because, at the time of their actions,
Harvey had not yet been decided. Id.
158. Id.
159. Commonwealth v Melilli, 521 Pa 405, 555 A2d 1254 (1989).
160. Melili, 555 A2d at 1256-57.
161. Id at 1257.
162. Id. The procurement by officers of a court order as a prerequisite to installation
was apparently to comply with telephone company regulations, and did not consist of a
probable cause determination by a magistrate acting in a neutral capacity. Id.
Vol. 30:115
Recent Decisions
facts, the Supreme Court found the lower court's reliance on Leon
inappropriate. 63 However, the decision did not specifically address
the applicability of the good faith exception as a matter of Penn-
sylvania law; it merely examined the Superior Court's invocation of
Leon based on that court's assumption that such was part of Penn-
sylvania law. 64
Following the Supreme Court's Melilli decision, the Pennsylva-
nia appellate courts decided a series of cases touching on the exis-
tence and circumstances in which a good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule could be applied as a matter of Pennsylvania law.
In Commonwealth v Gilliam,'65 an evenly divided Supreme
Court let stand the decision of the Superior Court affirming appel-
lant's conviction for drug possession and related offenses.- 6 Appel-
lant contended that the search warrant involved violated his rights
under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8, be-
cause the warrant failed to specify with sufficient accuracy the
identity of the persons to be searched.6 7 Despite the affirmation
without opinion, Justice Flaherty issued an Opinion in Support of
Reversal, 68 in which he analyzed the Commonwealth's good faith
argument. In support of affirmation, the Commonwealth cited
Commonwealth v Mason'6 9 as supporting the applicability of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where an of-
ficer relied on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, which subsequently proved to be defective. 170 In rejecting
this contention, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Common-
wealth was misreading Mason.'7' That decision, rather than open-
ing a "good faith" door, in fact mandated exclusion in cases where
163. Id at 1260.
164. Id. In concluding their consideration of this issue, the court agreed to postpone
until another date and case their decision on whether a good faith exception existed as a
matter of Pennsylvania law. Id at 1262.
165. 522 Pa 138, 560 A2d 140 (1989).
166. Gilliam, 560 A2d at 140. Acting on a warrant authorizing them to search a partic-
ular residence and "all occupants therein," officers of the Erie Police Department discovered
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id at 141.
167. Id.
168. Id. Chief Justice Robert N. C. Nix, Jr. and Justice Stephen A. Zappala joined in
this opinion. Id. An Opinion in Support of Reversal is a justice's opinion which expresses his
disagreement with the court's decision in a case in which no Opinion of the Court is issued.
(For similar usage, see Selan v Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 495 Pa 324, 433 A2d 871
(1981); Commonwealth v Walker Pontiac Inc., 488 Pa 575, 413 A2d 375 (1979); and Eve-
rette v City of New Kensington, 262 Pa Super 28, 396 A2d 467 (1978)).
169. 507 Pa 396, 490 A2d 421, 425 (1985).




violation of a rule of criminal procedure takes on constitutional
dimensions. 17  The court determined that in the instant case the
appellee's right to privacy and to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion was fundamental, with the only proper rem-
edy for such violation being exclusion of the evidence.173
While the opinion in Gilliam is not accorded precedential
weight, it nevertheless marks the beginning of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's stand against the establishment of a good faith
exception. In the closing paragraphs of the opinion, the three jus-
tices expressly rejected such an exception in cases where the Com-
monwealth fails to specifically describe the place to be searched or
make a proper connection between the place to be searched and
unnamed or unidentified persons found therein. 7 4 Previously, in
Melilli, the Supreme Court only examined the possibility of a good
faith exception in hypothetical terms in examining its invocation
by the Superior Court. 7 5 The Gilliam Opinion in Support of Re-
versal, conversely, speaks in definite terms, outlining a situation
where good faith is inapplicable. 7 '
Pennsylvania's good faith exception was next addressed in Com-
monwealth v Haggerty.177 In the majority opinion by Judge
Tamilia, the court found that while the affidavit was defective as
claimed by appellee, and an inquiry beyond its four corners was
prohibited by Rule 2003,178 the warrant was nevertheless still valid
as claimed by the Commonwealth under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test. 9 The court reversed and remanded to the trial
court and went on to state, in dicta, that were a good faith excep-
172. Id.
[R]ecent decisions of this Court have reaffirmed the principle that technical viola-
tions of the Rules regarding the issuance and execution of a search warrant do not
ordinarily render the search unreasonable nor require the exclusion of evidence,
whereas violations of the Rules which assume constitutional dimensions and/or sub-
stantially prejudice the accused may require the exclusion of evidence so seized.
Id, quoting Mason, 490 A2d at 425.
173. Gilliam, 560 A2d at 144.
174. Id.
175. Mellini, 555 A2d at 1259.
176. Gilliam, 560 A2d at 144.
177. 388 Pa Super 67, 564 A2d 1269 (1989). In executing a search warrant, officers
seized a quantity of cocaine from appellee's residence. Appellee filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant based on the failure of the affidavit to
state the time frame of an informant's observations which formed the basis for determining
probable cause. The trial court granted the motion and the Commonwealth appealed to the
Superior Court. Haggerty, 564 A2d at 1270.
178. See note 17 for the text of PaRCrP 2003.
179. Haggerty, 564 A2d at 1271. See note 51.
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tion a part of the Pennsylvania law, the facts in this case would fall
within such an exception.'
Given their previous recognition of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, when confronted with Commonwealth v Ed-
munds""l the Pennsylvania Superior Court saw the nearly identical
fact pattern to that in Morris as making the exception equally
applicable.
In upholding the trial court's admission of evidence seized pur-
suant to an invalid search warrant,' the Superior Court viewed
Edmunds as an occasion to expressly adopt the Leon good faith
exception as a matter of Pennsylvania law. While observing that
the text of Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution is
almost identically worded to that of the Fourth Amendment,"8 the
court expressed the view that, when interpreting such sections of
the state constitution, great deference should be accorded to
United States Supreme Court decisions construing the analogous
federal section.184 Because in Leon the United States Supreme
Court saw fit to incorporate a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule associated with the Fourth Amendment, the Superior
Court found no compelling reason to deviate from this interpreta-
tion and thus adopted the exception as applying to instances of a
violation of Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution.8 5
In Commonwealth v Patterson,'"8 decided two years later, the
Superior Court relied on Edmunds as precedent for the existence
of a good faith exception as a matter of state law.8 7 In this case,
appellant was convicted of criminal homicide based in part on evi-
dence seized from his residence twenty-two years earlier pursuant
to a search warrant. 8 8 While the prosecution could not produce
the warrant covering appellant's residence at the time of trial, tes-
timony indicated that one had been issued." 9 The Superior Court
affirmed the trial court's admission of the items seized pursuant to
the absent warrant, reasoning that because it appeared from the
180. Haggerty, 564 A2d at 1272.
181. 373 Pa Super 384, 541 A2d 368 (1988), rev'd, 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991).
182. For a detailed discussion of the facts of Edmunds, see the opening paragraphs of
this case note.
183. Edmunds, 541 A2d at 372.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 392 Pa Super 331, 572 A2d 1258 (1990).
187. Patterson, 572 A2d at 1266.
188. Id at 1261.
189. Id at 1265.
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testimony that one had been issued by a neutral magistrate, this
was sufficient to admit the items under the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.190
The Superior Court slightly modified the scope of their good
faith exception in Commonwealth v Flaherty,' in which they af-
firmed the trial court's exclusion of drugs seized from appellee's
automobile. 19 The search warrant in question was issued by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate based on an affidavit which failed to
state facts sufficient to establish probable cause. 193 The court re-
fused to invoke the good faith exception, noting that neither the
magistrate nor the affiant police officer were aware of additional
facts sufficient to constitute probable cause,19 4 and distinguished
their prior recognition of the exception in Haggerty, Edmunds,
and Morris based upon the presence of such additional facts in
those cases. 95
With the competing concepts evinced by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's line of cases recognizing an expanded right of pri-
vacy under Article I, section 8 of the state constitution, and the
series of Superior Court decisions approving a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, a clash was inevitable. The question post-
poned in Melilli96 was ultimately presented to the Supreme Court
on appeal from the Superior Court's decision in Edmunds.1
9
7
In declining to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, the Edmunds opinion rests on two state law pillars which
hold it towering over the Leon Fourth Amendment floor. The first
is the strong history of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision
protecting individual privacy from unreasonable governmental in-
trusion. With the precursor of Article I, section 8 antedating the
Fourth Amendment by more than a decade,'98 the court found a
190. Id at 1265-66. In both Leon and the Superior Court's Edmunds decision, the good
faith exception was applied where a law enforcement officer executed an apparently valid
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate which later failed for lack of probable
cause. It is difficult to reconcile how the present set of facts fits the good faith exception,
since there is no denial of the existence of probable cause. Apparently, the instant case
applied a hybrid type of exception, the exact nature of which is unexplained in the Superior
Court's opinion.
191. 400 Pa Super 397, 583 A2d 1175 (1990).
192. Flaherty, 583 A2d at 1176.
193. Id at 1179.
194. Id at 1183.
195. Id at 1180.
196. Melilli, 555 A2d at 1262.
197. 373 Pa Super 384, 541 A2d 368 (1988).
198. See note 38.
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sufficient traditional foundation on which to base the independent
state privacy right, making it more extensive than that federally
recognized. As the court cogently pointed out, it was the federal
provision which was patterned after language in the constitution of
Pennsylvania and other colonies, rather than the reverse.199
In light of this strong historical background, it is interesting to
note that the privacy right was not protected by the exclusionary
remedy until it was made obligatory in Mapp.00 Further, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never expressly adopted exclu-
sion as the remedy for violations of Article I, section 8.201 So while
the abstract right may be historically unassailable, the strength of
the remedy is considerably less firm.
The second pillar upholding Edmunds is the probable cause re-
quirement also embodied in Article I, section 8. Having its origin
in the same section of the Commonwealth's original 1776 constitu-
tion, the real strength of the requirement is found more in policies
of the Supreme Court than precedent. The absence of probable
cause in Edmunds was due to the officer's failure to comply fully
with Rule 2003, the requirements of which the court agreed are not
contained expressly within the state's organic document.0 2 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court endorsed what has come to be known
as the "four corners" rule in Commonwealth v Milliken,20 3 requir-
ing that all statements supporting probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant be contained within the supporting affidavit(s),
and that verbal additions thereto at a suppression hearing not be
countenanced. While the court recognized this was not a require-
ment contained in the state constitution, it nevertheless held that
such procedures served to positively protect the integrity of the
probable cause determination.0 4 Thereafter the court promulgated
Rule 2003, codifying the holding in Milliken. Given this framework
it appears that, if a future Supreme Court was to amend Chapter
2000 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,20 5 the force behind this
part of the Edmunds rationale could lose much of its vitality.
Edmunds is definitely a landmark Pennsylvania search and
199. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 896.
200. Id at 897.
201. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1293 (Larsen dissenting).
202. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 902.
203. 450 Pa 310, 300 A2d 78 (1973).
204. Milliken, 300 A2d at 81.
205. Chapter 2000 of the PaRCrP contains all rules relevant to the issuance and exe-
cution of search warrants.
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seizure case; one providing a good example of adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds for the interpretation of a right not feder-
ally reviewable. 20 6 As such, it amply demonstrates the role of the
state constitution as a strong, independent source of protection for
basic liberties, one which brings control of rights and their inter-
pretation closer to the hands of the governed.07 It underscores the
importance of citizen interest and involvement in the judicial elec-
tion process, with implications ranging from criminal law to public
employee labor relations and future constitutional construction.
In the arena of criminal law, the Edmunds rule serves as a warn-
ing to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors that Pennsylvania
courts will not accept evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid
search warrant. Defense counsel are now armed with an additional
tool to use in scrutinizing police practices while formulating a de-
fense. Upon closer inspection, however, the decision is not as revo-
lutionary as it may seem.
In recent years Pennsylvania appellate decisions have expressed
the rule that not all violations of the rules of criminal procedure
will result in exclusion of evidence. If a violation does not take on
"constitutional dimensions," it will not invoke operation of the ex-
clusionary rule.208 Thus, mere technical mistakes will not result in
freeing a defendant.
Viewed against this background, Edmunds is merely the applica-
tion of the Pennsylvania exclusionary mechanism to the state right
to privacy. The result is that now privacy as defined by state case
law becomes part of the package of rights which must be examined
in determining what sort of procedural rule violation has "consti-
tutional dimensions." The fact that a rights violation must be sub-
stantial before it will require exclusion of evidence under Pennsyl-
vania law cannot be discounted, as nothing in Edmunds overrules
this proposition.
Certain facts present in Edmunds but not addressed by the
court's opinion independently mitigate against establishment of a
good faith exception. It is not unjustified to require that police pay
attention to details mandated by the constitution and rules of
criminal procedure. Today more law enforcement applicants have
college degrees than ever before, certainly more than when the
206. For a discussion of the standard for federal reviewability of state appellate court
decisions, see note 48.
207. Indeed, Edmunds has been cited as an example of independent state constitu-
tional jurisprudence in Commonwealth v Ludwig, - Pa -, 594 A2d 281, 283-84 (1991).
208. Gilliam, 560 A2d at 144.
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landmark opinions in Miranda v Arizona20 9 and Mapp first revolu-
tionized police procedures, and if they cannot operate within the
precepts laid down by constitutional and statutory authority, the
solution lies in setting higher educational entry standards for such
positions, not in the curbing of constitutional rights.
Finally, while the Commonwealth had urged adoption of the
Leon rule, the instant case was factually distinguishable from
Leon. Edmunds involved lack of probable cause based on factual
insufficiency per Rule 2003, not, strictly speaking, due to the mag-
istrate's improper weighing of facts under the totality of the cir-
cumstances test. The officer knew or should have known from the
rules what was required. By omitting the crucial facts from the
warrant application, he failed to do all that he was required to do
under the law. The rationale that when a magistrate errantly de-
termines that probable cause exists the police have also done all
that is legally possible to secure a warrant had been advanced by
the Superior Court as one reason the police should not be penal-
ized by exclusion.210 However, the error of applying this logic uni-
versally in alleged good faith situations is exposed by the instant
facts. To allow such to continue under -the guise of good faith
would simply encourage sloppy police work and inattention to con-
stitutionally mandated details in non-exigent situations.21'
Edmunds also presents an excellent factual background to illus-
trate the problems inherent with the good faith exception in regard
to magisterial independence and competency. In this case the
"neutral and detached magistrate" functioned as a veritable secre-
tary, typing out the affidavit as the officer dictated it, then issuing
a warrant which included a baseless authorization to search the
Edmunds residence.
The fact that such an insupportable warrant could be issued,
permitting government intrusion into the privacy of one's resi-
dence, serves as a strong statement concerning the lack of compe-
tency and independence of certain members of the minor judiciary.
209. 384 US 486 (1966). Under Miranda, the in-custody statements made by a defend-
ant who has not been advised of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution are generally inadmissible. Miranda, 384 US at 439, 444.
210. Melilli, 522 A2d at 1112.
211. For example, an officer could conveniently forget to put the time of an inform-
ant's observation in the affidavit (when the information was in fact stale), then make the
application before a less astute magistrate hoping to give the "mistake" a judicial seal of
approval. Under such facts it would be extremely difficult to prove the officer's knowledge at
the time of application, yet this is what Leon would require in order to successfully prevent
the application of the good faith exception. Leon, 468 US at 923.
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To permit a blanket good faith exception in a system fraught with
errors such as these would be to seriously dilute the effective
strength of state constitutional rights.212
The above reasons for distinguishing and supporting Edmunds
as a matter of Pennsylvania law and policy, combined with the fact
that it reversed the conviction for a non-violent crime, made the
case an ideal, socially acceptable vehicle in which to reject the good
faith exception.
In examining the overall picture, it is important to note that Ed-
munds does not create a new right; rather, it reaffirms and applies
the existing right of privacy as a matter of state constitutional law.
While the case immediately impacts the search and seizure sub-
area of the criminal law, the repercussions it generates have the
potential to reach into many other fields, including public em-
ployee labor relations and tort law. Since the foundation of the
majority decision is the implied right of privacy rooted in Article I,
section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution, the court could later
find that the right's scope extends beyond the area of search and
seizure, establishing a standard which could be invoked by litigants
in controversies involving tortious invasions of privacy.213
Aside from the substantive issues resolved and raised by the
case, the establishment of a structure to be utilized by future liti-
gants in addressing state constitutional issues is practically signifi-
cant. Justice Cappy's majority opinion not only advocates the for-
mat for practitioners, but utilizes it in reaching the court's
decision.
Under the new requirements, future litigants raising state consti-
tutional questions must address certain mandatory points in their
appellate briefs. These include the text of the pertinent Pennsylva-
nia constitutional provision; its history, including Pennsylvania
case law; related federal precedent and case law from other states;
212. Whether the magistrate read and independently reviewed the affidavit, or simply
relied on the fact that she "knew" the police officer and in effect allowed his probable cause
determination to substitute for her own, remain unanswered questions. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to even consider this possibility. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 904-05.
213. In O'Connor v Ortega, 480 US 709 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held
that while government employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of their desks in a government office, the operational realities of the workplace may make
some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when a superior makes the intrusion
as opposed to a law enforcement officer. It is possible that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
could employ the Edmunds view of the privacy interest to reach a different, more protective




policy considerations, including those particularly of state and lo-
cal concern; and applicability within modern Pennsylvania juris-
prudence.214 Of the decision's many repercussions, possibly this
one will have the most significance for practitioners in a wide vari-
ety of legal concentrations.
Determining a defendant's guilt or innocence based on all truth-
ful evidence, an ideal repeated by Justice White in Leon,1 5 merits
greater consideration than accorded by Edmunds. It is difficult to
justify the theoretical merits of the exclusionary rule to the victim
of rape, or discuss its virtuous points with the family of a homicide
victim, when it has resulted in the release of the perpetrator.
1 6
Such arguments do not, however, require the evisceration of the
exclusionary rule with a universally applicable good faith
exception.
An alternative holding could have been adopted, permitting in-
vocation of the good faith exception only in cases involving mala in
11se crimes. This would serve to further the dual purposes of the
exclusionary rule while simultaneously accommodating the per-
ceived need for its discretionary, rather than automatic, applica-
tion. Its implementation would simply result in the accused being
given greater protection against government abuse in those in-
stances where he is charged with a government-created offense,
and all the players on the opposing team are on the state payroll.
As such, the proposal would give effect to the rule's dual purposes
stated in Mapp.
The rule's first purpose, deterrence of misconduct by state of-
ficers, would be served by virtue of the fact that no matter who
was responsible for the dereliction in the warrant issuance process
(police affiant or magistrate), the state would be prevented from
using the seized items as evidence in cases involving mala prohib-
ita offenses.218 It is important to note that when Article I, section 8
214. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 895.
215. Leon, 468 US at 900-01, quoting Alderman v United States, 394 US 165 (1969).
216. It is precisely such hollow arguments which are envisioned by the Leon majority's
reference to the rule's unintended effect of lessening the public's respect for law. Leon, 468
US at 908.
217. Black's Law Dictionary defines "mala in se" crimes as: "Wrongs in themselves;
acts morally wrong; offenses against conscience." Black's Law Dictionary 861 (West, 5th ed
1979).
218. Black's Law Dictionary defines "mala prohibita" offenses as:
Prohibited wrongs or offenses; acts which are made offenses by positive laws, and
prohibited as such. Acts or omissions which are made criminal by statute but which,
of themselves, are not criminal. Generally, no criminal intent or mens rea is required
and the mere accomplishment of the act or omission is sufficient for criminal liability.
1991
Duquesne Law Review
was first enacted, law enforcement agencies as they presently exist
were unknown. Thus it appears that the framer's original concern
in including this section was to dissuade improper conduct on the
part of the state generally, encompassing both the executive and
judicial branches. Prosecutions involving mala prohibita offenses
would therefore stand or fall on the actions of all state officers in-
volved, in keeping with the philosophy that the constitution is to
serve as a limit on government. 19
Secondly, by permitting a good faith exception in cases involving
the mala in se crimes, the fears which have evolved that judicial
integrity is diminished by the public perception of a system which
frees dangerous offenders on minor technicalities would be greatly
diminished.
Legal variations in the application of criminal procedures which
depend upon the gravity and nature of the offense in general, and
the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction in particular, are not un-
known in modern law. For example, we protect the rights of those
sentenced to capital punishment more fervently than other offend-
ers via a system of automatic appeal to the state supreme court,220
and conversely, the right to trial by jury in criminal actions is re-
served only for those charged with certain classes of offenses which
subject the offender to imprisonment upon conviction.221
Applying this modified good faith exception to the facts in Ed-
munds would produce the same result. Because the possessory of-
fenses with which appellant was charged are by their nature mala
prohibita, that prong of the suggested rule would prohibit a good
faith exception from being invoked, and the evidence would be
Term is used in contrast to mala in se which are acts which are wrongs in themselves
such as robbery.
Id.
219. Strict application of the exclusionary rule would be especially appropriate given
the proliferation of forfeiture laws, the fruits of which directly benefit law enforcement
agencies.
220. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9546(d) (Purdon 1991). This section reads: "Review of
order in death penalty cases.-A final court order under this subchapter in a case in which
the death penalty has been imposed shall be directly appealable only to the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rules." Id.
221. For example, see Commonwealth v Mayberry, 459 Pa 91, 327 A2d 86 (1974), in
which it was held that both the federal and state constitution mandate a jury trial only for
one accused of serious criminal offenses, a term interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court to mean those providing for a prison term of six months or more in Codispoti v Penn-
sylvania, 418 US 506 (1974). See also Commonwealth v Jackson, 345 Pa 456, 28 A2d 894
(1942), which held that the guaranty of trial by jury extended only to common law offenses,
meaning those which had been established prior to the adoption of the constitution. Accord,




When one attempts to square this approach with the supporting
principles enunciated by Justice Cappy, however, one encounters
several problems. The second pillar in the majority's reasoning
would be virtually insurmountable even to the adoption of a good
faith exception limited to cases involving mala in se crimes. While
the relatively recent vintage of the exclusionary rule as a matter of
state jurisprudence lessens the force of its privacy argument, the
court's reliance on the strength of the procedural rules as a policy
background in assessing probable cause cannot be underestimated.
As such, no form of good faith exception can be implemented as a
matter of Pennsylvania law without the supreme court changing
either the procedural rules governing the issuance of search war-
rants, or their interpretation as inviolable in establishing probable
cause.
The path which future decisions will take in the aftermath of
Edmunds is uncertain. The court itself questioned the need for the
good faith exception in pointing to the significance of their adop-
tion of the totality of the circumstances test for determining prob-
able cause.222 The passage of time may reveal the decision's actual
legacy to be the staunch support given the constitutional right to
privacy, the reaffirmation of the criminal rules as crucial in the
probable cause determination, and certainly its pattern for state
constitutional analysis.
Providing a blanket good faith exception would go a long way
toward abrogating the fundamental protections afforded by Article
I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution. Strictly prohibiting
the exception as in Edmunds may result in the exaction of a price
in the form of freedom for violent offenders, which an increasingly
conservative society will no longer accept. As was acknowledged by
the court in Edmunds, policy considerations play an important
role in determining the meaning and scope of a particular state
constitutional right. The passage of time will provide the barome-
ter by which to measure changing public sentiments and percep-
tions of the privacy protection, which may in turn influence a fu-
ture court to adopt some form of limited good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule as a matter of Pennsylvania law.
Louis A. Smith, II
222. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 904.
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